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Introduction 
Online peer-to-peer lending (P2PL) is a fast growing financial service industry that presents 
challenges to consumer protection rationales and orthodoxies by enabling individuals to 
borrow and lend to one another principally through unsecured loan transactions brokered by 
an online platform. P2PL has been acclaimed as a phenomenon that could help fill the space 
left by traditional bank and non-bank lending.1 Apparently existing in the peripheral lending 
economy for centuries in the form of friendly societies, credit unions, payday loans and 
microcredit,2 P2PL has “re-emerged” on a larger scale thanks to the internet which allows 
people to connect and interact through organised online networks. The emergence of online 
P2PL is also due to the recent global financial crisis which has caused banks to tighten 
lending guidelines.3 Consumers, who have consequently found it difficult to obtain credit, 
now have an alternative means of doing so.4 Internet technology has transformed the lending 
market in various ways and facilitated the ease of contact between lenders and borrowers. For 
example, it has enabled the execution of a lending contract by clicking on an acceptance 
 
1
 M. Pagano, ‘Peer-to-peer lending boom could make banks obsolete’ The Independent, Monday 17 December 
2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/peertopeer-lending-boom-could-make-banks-obsolete-
8421241.html [Accessed May 10, 2014]. 
2
 A. Brill, "Peer-to-peer lending: innovative access to credit and the consequences of Dodd-Frank" (2010) 25 
Wash Leg Found Leg Backgrounder 1. 
3
 Brill, "Peer-to-peer lending: innovative access to credit and the consequences of Dodd-Frank"(2010) 25 Wash 
Leg Found Leg Backgrounder 1. 
4
 J.R. Magee, "Peer-to-peer lending in the United States: surviving after Dodd-Frank" (2011) 15 NC Bank Inst 
139 at 140. 
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button.5  However, the internet has also led to the emergence of virtual consumer protection 
concerns such as unlicensed and shadowy lending6 and pyramid schemes.7 
Online P2PL is a relatively new area for regulation and legal research and has not been 
subjected to much legal analysis outside of the U.S., including the UK where the business 
model first emerged.8 In fact, existing legal and regulatory scholarship on P2PL has focused 
on the U.S. securities law.9 Although the pioneering regulation of P2PL in the U.S. suggests a 
more established regulatory and legal treatment, a very simplistic approach that glosses over 
the issues is apparent. In the U.S., P2PL has been classified as securities and regulated under 
that body of law, with the Securities and Exchange Commission requiring that P2PL 
platforms register as issuers under the Securities Act of 1933.10 Regulatory responses to 
online P2PL in the UK and elsewhere have been slow partly due to the view that it is 
essentially a private affair of the individual participants.11 The novelty of P2PL is another 
 
5
 See Bassano v Toft and others [2014] EWHC 377 (QB). 
6
 R. Mayer, “When and why usury should be prohibited” (2013) 116 Journal of Business Ethics 513 at 524. 
7
 See, for example, 4finance UAB v Valstybinė vartotojų teisių apsaugos tarnyba and another (Case C-515/12) 
[2014] Bus LR 574. 
8
 In light of the scarcity of much legal and regulatory scholarship on P2PL in the UK, this article draws on 
existing U.S. focused literature that compares different regulatory approaches, motives and treatment of key 
issues and offers lessons for the UK. 
9
 Brill, "Peer-to-peer lending: innovative access to credit and the consequences of Dodd-Frank"(2010) 25 Wash 
Leg Found Leg Backgrounder 1; A. Verstein, "The misregulation of person-to-person lending" (2011) 45 UCDL 
Rev 445. 
1010
 Verstein, "The misregulation of person-to-person lending" (2011) 45 UCDL Rev 445 at 448. 
11
 J.A. Gardner, Innovation and the future proof bank: a practical guide to doing different business-as-usual 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2011); P. Manbeck and S. Hu, “Peer-to-peer lending: a summary of the principal 
and regulatory issues (2014 Update)” (Chapman and Cutler LLP, 2014), 
http://www.aba.com/Tools/Offers/Documents/Chapman_Regulation_of_Peer-to-Peer_Lending_0414.pdf 
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possible reason for the regulatory inertia. For example, the P2PL business model was not 
regulated by the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) since it did not fall within the 
categories of regulated activities under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2002.  
However, on 1 April 2014, P2PL fell under the regulatory remit of the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA), which replaced the FSA in 2013 and has recognised a new regulatory 
activity of “operating an electronic system in relation to lending”.12 The FCA has recently 
detailed a new regime for regulating internet loan-based and investment-based crowdfunding 
platforms.13 P2PL falls under the loan-based type of crowdfunding,14 an umbrella term used 
by the FCA for a wide spectrum of internet-based business models involving the participation 
of a large number of people contributing relatively small amounts. The FCA’s approach is in 
marked contrast to the U.S. simplistic strategy of fitting P2PL within existing financial 
regulatory structures. Nevertheless, P2PL was not expressly considered in the heavily 
debated consumer protection objective of the FCA regime. It is, for instance, arguable that 
 
[Accessed May 10, 2014]; M.J. Scire, Person-to-person lending (PPL): new regulatory challenges could 
emerge as the industry grows (Darby, PA: Dianne Publishing, 2011); R. Zeng, “Legal regulations in P2P 
financing in the U.S. and Europe” (2013) 10 US-China Law Review 229 at 234. 
12
 Financial Conduct Authority, Consultation Paper CP13/17 High-level proposals for an FCA regime for 
consumer credit, 6 March 2013, 68; S. Read, “Peer-to-Peer Lenders Get a Boost from Regulation - Spend & 
Save – Money”, The Independent, 8 December 2012) <http://www.independent.co.uk/money/spend-
save/peertopeer-lenders-get-a-boost-from-regulation-8393637.html, [Accessed 21 March 2013]. 
13
 Financial Conduct Authority, The FCA’s regulatory approach to crowdfunding over the internet, and the 
promotion of non-readily realisable securities by other media (Policy Statement, PS14/4)  (March 2014), 
http://www.fca.org.uk/news/firms/ps14-04-crowdfunding [Accessed May 10, 2014]. 
14
 Financial Conduct Authority, (Policy Statement, PS14/4) at 11. 
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the FCA’s classification of P2P lenders as retail investors15 demonstrates a lack of 
recognition that P2PL can involve consumers- lenders and borrowers- on both sides of a loan 
transaction. 
The emergence of online P2PL appears to challenge certain fundamental assumptions, 
objectives and frameworks of consumer protection law and policy of the EU and UK. P2PL 
raises questions about the definition of a “consumer of financial services” by altering the 
characteristics of key participants in a lending transaction. In particular, there is the twin 
problem of the status of P2P lenders and the appropriate degree of protection that should be 
afforded to them. This, in turn, appears to challenge the orthodox business-consumer 
terminology that is considered “a starting point”16 in consumer law and policy. It also 
reignites the long-standing information versus intervention debate on consumer protection.17 
There are implications for consumer lending, wider consumer protection and financial 
regulation if, for example, the roles of platforms in the P2PL processes are not properly 
recognised. A condition precedent to appropriate regulation of any financial intermediation is 
to identify and recognise the distinctive features of relevant intermediaries.18 Moreover, 
topical consumer lending issues such as fairness of commercial practices and responsible 
 
15
 Financial Conduct Authority, (Policy Statement, PS14/4) at 16, 31. Contrast Financial Services Authority, 
“The Financial Conduct Authority: approach to regulation” (June 2011) at 16. 
16
 D.M. Collins, “Misleading APRs in consumer credit agreements: a new influence?” (2012) 7 Journal of 
Business Law 629 at 635. 
17
 G. Howells, “The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information” (2005) 32 Journal of 
Law and Society 349; S. Weatherill, EU consumer law and policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005). 
18
 P.K. Staikouras, “A novel reasoning of the UK Supreme Court decision in Lehman Brothers: the MiFID 
segregation rule from the angle of financial intermediation and regulation theory” (2014) 2 Journal of Business 
Law 97 at 104-109. 
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lending19 heavily tilt towards controlling the behaviour of the business supply side of lending 
transactions. 
The aim of this article is to assess the consumer protection justifications for regulating P2PL, 
demonstrating the appropriateness and suitability of a more interventionist consumer 
protection approach. We argue that regulation ought to recognise the consumer-to-consumer 
transaction model of P2PL and consequently reflect the need to protect two very different 
types of consumers: lenders, who may begin to increasingly include inexperienced investors 
as the P2PL investment form grows in popularity; and borrowers, the party typically 
associated as consumers. In the first part of the article, we will analyse the prototypical 
scheme, participation structure and intermediation role of platforms.  The second part will 
evaluate the challenges P2PL poses to the orthodox definition of consumer and bilateral 
business-consumer protection approach as well as the implications of P2PL to the pre-
contract, rational choice and information focus of traditional consumer protection regime. 
The final part will critically consider the potential and limitations of key components of the 
P2PL regulatory regime the FCA recently established.  
P2PL intermediation  
In online P2PL, a platform facilitates direct finance between individuals by enabling them to 
lend and borrow money from each other without the intermediation of institutional lenders.20 
 
19
 S. Brown, “Using the law as a usury law: definitions of usury and recent developments in the regulation of 
unfair charges in consumer credit transactions” (2011) 1 Journal of Business Law 91. 
20
  Brill, "Peer-to-peer lending: innovative access to credit and the consequences of Dodd-Frank" (2010) 25 
Wash Leg Found Leg Backgrounder 1 ;  Magee, "Peer-to-peer lending in the United States: surviving after 
Dodd-Frank"(2011) 15 NC Bank Inst 139 at 140;  Verstein, "The misregulation of person-to-person lending" 
(2011) 45 UCDL Rev 445 at 452. 
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P2PL platforms are not structured as the online versions of institutional intermediation such 
as banks and credit unions. For example, there are significant differences between P2PL and 
credit unions although both are tripartite schemes for pooling savings from individuals for 
lending to other persons. Credit unions are largely democratic associations of members 
sharing a common bond of residence or occupation and can be for profit or the social goals of 
financial inclusion and poverty alleviation.21 The profit-oriented P2PL, in contrast, is not 
structured democratically and does not require associational common good for participation. 
In fact, P2PL participants are often unknown to one another. 
A key point here is that ‘lending’ activities are brokered by an online platform and in most 
cases lenders do not lend directly to borrowers. Rather, lenders each fund a portion of a loan 
and recuperate a pro-rated share of the principal and interest payments.22  There are normally 
three participants in online P2PL- platforms, borrowers and lenders- although it is an industry 
with varying business models and structures that are susceptible to changes as it continues to 
grow. What follows is a description of how a platform, Zopa,23 works since it represents a 
fairly typical idea of the structures and operations of online P2PL platforms generally. 
 
21
 N. Ryder, “Banking on credit unions in the new millennium?” (2001) Sep Journal of Business Law 510 at 
511; N. Ryder, “Credit unions in the United Kingdom: a critical analysis of their legislative framework and its 
impact upon their development” (2003) Jan Journal of Business Law 46 at 45-51; N. Ryder, “Out with the old 
and in with the new? A critical analysis of contemporary policy towards the development of credit unions in 
Great Britain” (2005) Sep Journal of Business Law 617 at 617-624; N.R. Ryder and C. Chambers, “The credit 
crunch – are credit unions able to ride out the storm?” (2009) 11(1) Journal of Banking Regulation 76 at 81. 
22
 I. Galloway, "Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco: peer-to-peer lending and community development 
finance" (2009) 21 Community Invest 4. 
23
 Zopa, A smarter way to manage your money, http://www.zopa.com/, [Accessed May 1, 2014]. 
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Zopa was the first online P2PL website in the UK and indeed worldwide,24 there are now 
several other platforms including Ratesetter and Funding Circle in the UK and Prosper in 
USA. Set up in March 2005, Zopa, which stands for “zone of possible agreement”, is the 
range between the lowest one person is prepared to get for something and the highest another 
person is prepared to give up for something.25 Zopa users set up an account and register as 
either a lender or a borrower, usually using pseudonyms. Borrowers fill out an application 
similar to a bank application form and give Zopa permission to access data on them. A 
combination of information that borrowers provide and information that Zopa purchases from 
Equifax and Credit Bureau enables Zopa to manage the risk of borrowers’ default for lenders 
by undertaking a unique credit scoring system of categories A*, A, B and C. A* is reserved 
for borrowers with the highest credit score.  
Prospective borrowers request a quote by stating the amount and length of proposed 
borrowings. Zopa matches this information with potential lenders, who have previously set 
out the conditions on which they are prepared to lend. Lenders, for example, can state their 
desired interest rates, the length of time they are prepared to lend for and the credit ratings of 
borrowers they prefer to lend to.26 Compared with traditional bank lending which is funded 
by customers’ deposits and lent out to other bank customers unknown to the depositors, 
 
24
 S. Freedman and G.Z. Jin, "Do social networks solve information problems for peer-to-peer lending? evidence 
from Prosper.Com" (SSRN Scholarly Paper, Social Science Research Network 14 November 2008) 1; A.C. 
Briceño Ortega and F. Bell, "Online social lending: borrower-generated content" (14th  Americas Conference on 
Information Systems- AMCIS 2008, Toronto, Canada, August 2008) 4,  http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2008/380, 
[Accessed April 10, 2014]. 
25
 Zopa, How can we help you? About Zopa, http://help.zopa.com/customer/portal/topics/349034-about-
zopa/articles#regulated [Accessed March 11, 2014]. 
26
 G. Andrews, (chief executive of Zopa) Interview with Evan Davis, “Alternative Finance” The Bottom Line 
BBC, February 17, 2013. 
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lenders on Zopa are apparently invested with greater decision-making responsibilities.27 Zopa 
suggests that lenders can decide their own interest rates by looking at what other lenders are 
doing and choose to lend at their own risk, while it only provides lenders with relevant 
information to make their own choices. Whilst lenders have increased involvement in the 
lending process, they therefore bear the risk of a borrower’s default in making repayments. 
As with most lending platforms, Zopa is not party to the loan contracts that it matches. 
Thus, Zopa purports to assume a background role in the spirit of providing a truly direct 
consumer-to-consumer exchange. Its role is merely to facilitate the making of contracts by 
managing risk, ensuring that lenders’ losses are as low as possible and within the 
expectations it has set, and providing information to participants. Zopa also spreads risk by 
diversifying the lenders’ funds. Whilst the average lender on Zopa makes £5000 available for 
lending, this can be spread across numerous borrowers in units of £10.28 Zopa assembles the 
cheapest loan it can out of the £10 units and presents them to a borrower as a quote. Each 
loan is unique to the borrower’s request for a quote and assembled in real time, suggesting 
that loans are not pre-packaged products that are sold to the borrower.29 Online P2PL 
lenders/investors can see the details of each loan, unlike traditional securitisation markets 
where loans are packaged into complex bundles and sold to investors.30 
 
27Briceño Ortega and Bell, "Online social lending: borrower-generated content", 
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2008/380, [Accessed April 10, 2014].  
28
  Brill, "Peer-to-peer lending: innovative access to credit and the consequences of Dodd-Frank";  Magee, 
"Peer-to-peer lending in the United States: surviving after Dodd-Frank" (2011) 15 NC Bank Inst 139 at 140;  
Verstein, "The misregulation of person-to-person lending" (2011) 45 UCDL Rev 445. 
29
 Andrews, “Alternative Finance” The Bottom Line BBC, February 17, 2013. 
30
 J.J. Kim, "Peer-to-peer lender relaunched - marketwatch" (The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2009) D5, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/peer-to-peer-lender-relaunched [Accessed March 7, 2014]. 
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P2PL platforms promise a simpler, more transparent lending landscape where borrowers 
know who they are liable to and lenders know which borrowers owe them money.31 A selling 
point for P2PL is that it saves money by eliminating the need for an intermediating bank. 
Consequently, borrowers are offered much lower interest rates and lenders can expect higher 
returns.32 P2PL provides individuals, small businesses and entrepreneurs with access to 
cheaper credit when they may be excluded from traditional loan sources.33 It allows investors 
to diversify their portfolios, thus reducing risk.34 However, P2PL in addition to consumer 
protection concerns can involve money laundering, privacy, data protection, terrorism 
financing and identity theft and other risks35 associated with traditional banking forms 
because platforms connect borrowers and lenders over matters of shared identity in a virtual 
environment. Individual participants are unlikely to have adequately researched or 
understood the risks of P2PL. As with other online transactions, the risk of fraudulent 
borrowing may be higher in P2PL than face-to-face negotiated loans.36  Inexperienced 
lenders may be susceptible to intentionally misleading conduct,37 particularly in P2PL models 
 
31
  Verstein, "The misregulation of person-to-person lending" (2011) 45 UCDL Rev 445 at 463. 
32
 Manbeck and Hu, “Peer-to-peer lending: a summary of the principal and regulatory issues (2014 Update)” 
http://www.aba.com/Tools/Offers/Documents/Chapman_Regulation_of_Peer-to-Peer_Lending_0414.pdf 
[Accessed May 10, 2014];  Verstein, "The misregulation of person-to-person lending" (2011) 45 UCDL Rev 445 
at 457. 
33
  Magee, "Peer-to-peer lending in the United States: surviving after Dodd-Frank" (2011) 15 NC Bank Inst 139;   
Verstein, "The misregulation of person-to-person lending" (2011) 45 UCDL Rev 445 at 460. 
34
  Magee, "Peer-to-peer lending in the United States: surviving after Dodd-Frank" (2011) 15 NC Bank Inst 139; 
Verstein, "The misregulation of person-to-person lending" (2011) 15 NC Bank Inst 139 at 460. 
35
 See J. Lane, V. Stoddern, S. Bender and H. Nissenbaum (eds.), Privacy, big data and the public good: 
frameworks for engagement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
36
  Verstein, "The misregulation of person-to-person lending" (2011) 45 UCDL Rev 445 at 470. 
37
  Verstein, "The misregulation of person-to-person lending" (2011) 45 UCDL Rev 445 at 466. 
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where lending decisions are influenced by personal stories presented to lenders by 
prospective borrowers describing the purpose of their borrowing. The need to protect such 
inexperienced lenders appears clear, especially given their status as consumers. Yet, it is that 
very status of the lenders that also challenges the orthodox definition of consumer. The 
implications of P2Pl to the notions of consumer and consumer approach must consequently 
be discussed.  
Financial consumer: status, information and responsibilisation 
In order to provide appropriate protection, a regulatory regime ought to display an awareness 
of the subjects it aims to protect and their typical behaviours, characteristics or background. 
As such, the EU consumer law and policy typically defines a consumer as a natural person 
acting for purposes outside of his or her normal business, trade or profession.38 Users of 
P2PL platforms appear to satisfy this orthodox definition of consumer. Although no empirical 
evidence of the P2PL users’ characteristics is available, comparisons can be drawn from a 
2013 report of the typical features of peer-to-business (P2B) lenders.39 Focusing on the UK-
based platform, Funding Circle, the report found that the typical P2B lender was male, highly 
 
38
 A. Roosendal, and S. Van Esch, “Commercial websites: consumer protection and power shifts” (2007) 
Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 13 at17-19; B. Schüller, “The definition of consumers in EU 
consumer law” in J. Devenney and M. Kenny (eds), European consumer protection: theory and practice 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 124. See also Proposal COM (2008) 614/3, Directives 
2005/29/EC, 85/577/EC, 97/7/EC and 99/44/EC. 
39
 Pierrakis and Collins, “Banking on each other. Peer-to-peer lending to business: evidence from funding 
circle” (April 2013), http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/banking_on_each_other.pdf, [Accessed April 
10, 2014]; Pierrakis and Collins, "Banking on each other: the rise of peer-to-peer lending to businesses" (April 
2013), http://www.nesta.org.uk/publications/banking-each-other-rise-peer-peer-lending-businesses, [Accessed 
April 10, 2014]. 
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educated, relatively wealthy, and had a science, business or finance degree.40 The report 
revealed that financial return was the main reason for lenders’ decision to lend money to 
companies and key considerations include the interest offered, the financial track record of 
the borrowing company and the risk rating. As the study centred on the typical users of just 
one platform and the P2B business model, one must be wary of relying on it for extrapolating 
the status quo demographic of P2PL models. As the P2PL industry expands and grows in 
popularity, the demographic of its lenders may change and become less predominantly male, 
highly educated and wealthy. Nevertheless, nothing suggests that users of P2PL platforms are 
not ordinary people acting outside their business, trade or profession.  
Lenders on P2PL platforms are often described as investors rather than consumers because 
they lend money directly to borrowers. This is exemplified by the FCA which appears to 
recognise P2P lenders as consumers following the provisions of the Financial Services Act 
2012 which define consumers broadly enough to include a range of retail customers and 
wholesale and professional investors.41 Under the Act, consumers are, “persons who use, 
have used or may use regulated financial services…have relevant rights or interests in 
relation to any of those services, have invested, or may invest, in financial instruments, or 
have relevant rights or interests in relation to financial instruments.”42 The FCA, however, 
essentially treats P2P lenders as “retail investors” rather than “retail consumers”. Retail 
consumers are defined as buyers of financial products or services for their own use or benefit 
 
40
 Brill, "Peer-to-peer lending: innovative access to credit and the consequences of Dodd-Frank" (2010) 25 Wash 
Leg Found Leg Backgrounder 1at 3. 
41
 Joint Committee on the draft Financial Services Bill, Session 2010-12 at [105]. 
42
  Financial Services Act 2012 s.1G(1). 
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either directly or through regulated firms, while retail investors are persons that purchase 
financial instruments such as shares, bonds and exchange-traded funds.43  
Classification as investor rather than consumer is significant because investor protection is 
completely different from consumer protection. Investor protection rules often assume a 
degree of expertise and are therefore less likely to be interventionist than ordinary consumer 
protection regulations. Typical investor protection rules including the segregation of client 
and financial intermediary’s accounts44 may be irrelevant in consumer protection. A non-
interventionist approach may seem appropriate and proportionate to the circumstances of the 
traditional lending and investment framework where the investors are investing in the true 
sense of the expression. P2B lenders may even be so regarded as investors going by the 
available research evidence45 suggesting a degree of financial awareness among such lenders. 
P2PL is, however, different because its lenders may well be ordinary people like its 
borrowers and share similar levels of investment/lending experience and knowledge, and, in 
fact, may face a greater risk of loss of money through borrowers’ default. P2P lenders and 
borrowers are unlikely to be significantly different in demonstrating “lack of experience, 
 
43
 Financial Services Authority, “The Financial Conduct Authority: approach to regulation” (June 2011) at 16. 
44
 Staikouras, “A novel reasoning of the UK Supreme Court decision in Lehman Brothers: the MiFID 
segregation rule from the angle of financial intermediation and regulation theory” (2014) 2 Journal of Business 
Law 97. 
45
 Pierrakis and Collins, “Banking on each other. Peer-to-peer lending to business: evidence from funding 
circle” http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/banking_on_each_other.pdf, [Accessed April 10, 2014]; 
Pierrakis and Collins, "Banking on each other: the rise of peer-to-peer lending to businesses" 
http://www.nesta.org.uk/publications/banking-each-other-rise-peer-peer-lending-businesses, [Accessed April 
10, 2014]. 
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unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract, [and] weak bargaining position”46 in 
their relationship and dealings with platforms. 
Nonetheless, the consumer protection measures of the recent FCA regime for retail investors 
are largely informational and restricted to appropriate information.47 This may seem right 
since the Financial Services Act 2012 adopts a differential approach to defining consumers 
and requires the FCA to take into consideration the varying degrees of risk involved in 
different investments or transactions consumers are involved in and their differing degrees of 
experience and expertise.48 Different types of consumer are provided with different levels of 
consumer protection and different regulated activities are subject to varying levels of 
intervention depending on what category a consumer of that service falls into. This 
differential approach is, however, problematic for P2PL which involves two consumers with 
similar levels of knowledge and experience who may find themselves subject to different 
levels of protection simply because of their participation as lender and borrower. It is 
noteworthy that experience is a critical factor in whether consumer protection measures apply 
to particular individuals.49 
 
46
 Director-General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481 at [17], per 
Lord Bingham. 
47
 That the consumer simply needs to have sufficient information to give informed consent is certainly the basis 
for the most important EU consumer protection measure including Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 
on unfair terms in consumer contracts OJ L 095 0029-0034. 
48
  Financial Services Act 2012 ss.1C(2)(a) and (b); Joint Committee on the draft Financial Services Bill, 
Session 2010-12 at [108]. 
49
 Maple Leaf v Rouvroy [2009] EWHC 257, [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 287; Patel v Patel [2009] 3264 (QB), 
[2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 864; Rahman v HSBC Bank plc [2012] EWHC 11 (Ch). 
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The designation of P2P lenders merely as retail investors tends to imbibe the neo-
classical/rational choice philosophy that aims to “responsibilise”50 and empower51 consumers 
through information disclosure and education. This may not be suitable for P2P lenders who 
lack sufficient high levels of investment know-how and are not very different from individual 
customers/depositors in traditional banking, particularly in pure, person-to-person P2PL 
models. Such lenders are unlikely to have independent access to information about 
borrowers, including potential use of multiple platforms, and are faced with the problems of 
information asymmetry and behavioural bias in addition to directly bearing the risk of 
borrowers’ default.  Compared to platforms, which may have independent verification and 
monitoring mechanisms, an individual P2P lender who has lent a fraction of a loan may not 
know the real financial situation of a borrower. The lender depends solely on what the 
borrower discloses and may not know whether the borrower has mounting financial 
difficulties from several sources.52 
It is instructive that similar issues of information asymmetry and behavioural bias trigger 
regulation in traditional bank lending. Banks are subject to regulation on deposit handling and 
how payments are made because they handle customers’ deposits, which are repayable on 
demand, and primarily bear the risk of borrowers’ default. Technically, banks simultaneously 
act as intermediaries between their customers and borrowers since loans are derived from 
customers’ deposits and borrowers are unknown to the customers. Borrowers do not know 
 
50
 I. Ramsay, “Consumer law, regulatory capitalism and the ‘new learning’ in regulation” (2006) 28 Sydney Law 
Review 9. 
51
 A. Arora, “Unfair contract terms and unauthorised bank charges: a banking lawyer’s perspective” (2012) 1 
Journal of Business Law 44 at 50. 
52
 Contrast the facts of the non-P2P social lending case of Patel v Patel [2009] EWHC 3264 (QB), [2010] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 864. 
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which proportion of borrowings comes from any particular customer and customers likewise 
are unaware of the destination of their money as loans. P2PL platforms similarly act as 
intermediaries between lenders and borrowers, although the degree of their involvement in 
the lending processes appears to be played down. 
The second difficulty is that the philosophy of responsibilisation and empowerment is not 
well suited to P2PL lenders. Indeed, such a philosophy assumes the ability to exercise power. 
P2PL lenders are however in fact powerless. This is in the sense of behavioural research 
which regards powerlessness as the inability to achieve desired outcomes.53 For instance, 
transactional parties respond to stressful situations in different ways and can cope by 
applying primary and secondary controls. Primary control uses active behaviours to change a 
situation to a preferred one while secondary control involves active and passive behaviours 
designed to alter oneself rather than a stressful situation.54  Powerlessness, which occurs 
when a party is unable to exercise primary control, is more likely to be case with online P2PL 
participants, particularly the lenders. Lenders rely on the platforms to deliver key aspects of 
the P2P lending transaction, e.g. loan repayments, credit risk assessments and pursuit of 
defaulting borrowers; and can at best apply secondary control and may not be able to exercise 
primary control at all.  
Rather than control, trust seems a key factor for lenders’ participation in P2PL.55 Trust makes 
a person vulnerable to another party even when that person is unable to monitor or control the 
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other party.56 Trustworthiness can arise out of the personality of the one who trusts, the 
competence and reputation of the one who inspires trust, or governance provided by a third 
party that enforces trust.57 Legal and economic theories emphasise the third party element of 
this tripartite typology which builds trust through the regulation of participants’ exchange and 
ensuring that participants keep their promises.58 Research demonstrates that individuals’ 
reluctance to engage in internet-based transactions is overcome if they trust business 
counterparties in terms of security, privacy and reliability. Similarly, online P2PL 
transactions require strangers to trust and cooperate with each other via platforms that have 
an exclusive access to participants’ personal recognisability factors. By analogy to a physical 
shop, a platform is arguably part of a consumer’s transactional decision. The concept of 
transactional decision includes the decision to enter a shop and any other decision related to 
“any decision taken by a consumer concerning whether, how and on what terms to 
purchase.”59 One can argue, for example, that P2PL platforms are the online equivalents of 
prominent shopping brands/shop owners that allow multiple retailers and service providers to 
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use their shop spaces, subject to a certain level of control from the owners. The need to 
clarify the status of platform intermediation is of paramount importance, a question to which 
we now turn. 
Clarifying the status of platform  
Like an internet service provider, a platform is therefore an “inevitable actor”60 in the P2PL 
processes that direct the course of a transaction and conduct of participants. This suggests 
that P2PL platforms play both passive and active roles in bringing lenders and borrowers 
together and regulating their relationship, a point that extends beyond the consumer 
protection realm into other regulatory fields. Take, for example, the data protection rules 
which grant data subjects access rights to data held by data controllers.61 Almost certainly, 
lenders and borrowers are equally data subjects whose personal data are possessed by 
platforms as data controllers. A platform is likely to be a data controller and not a data 
processor for being able to determine the purposes of data obtained from lenders and 
borrowers. Although platforms can perform data processing tasks such as obtaining, 
recording and holding information, loan repayment monitoring and collection, loan default 
management and recovery, provision of statements and complaints resolution,62  they can be 
data processors only if they act on behalf of data controllers. Lenders and borrowers are not 
in a position to act as data controllers and direct platforms on how to process data. Platforms 
are also more likely than lenders and borrowers to possess the capability to own and exploit 
intellectual property rights over relevant data.  
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In their capacity as brokers, platforms have access to information which they can 
communicate in ways neither borrowers nor lenders can do. A platform is in a position to 
moderate information provided by borrowers and to ensure that it is correct. It goes without 
saying that, without the involvement of platforms, inter-party misleading or inaccurate 
information would not be distributed. It is then arguable that the financial naivety of lenders 
may theoretically lean in their favour should they wish to establish a platform’s duty of care. 
However, platforms rarely, if ever, undertake to provide financial advice to lenders for each 
transaction. Quite the opposite, they make it clear to participants that they are not party to 
lending transactions. Although they connect lenders with borrowers, platforms’ services 
apparently exclude providing advice to lenders on the suitability or risks involved in a 
particular borrower or vice versa. This suggests that online P2PL does not seem to fit within 
existing consumer investment regulatory regimes. For example, key to the application of the 
Financial Instruments Directive63 to investment service and portfolio management is 
investment advice defined as “the provision of personal recommendation to a client.”64 
Generally, P2PL platforms refrain from making personal recommendations to lenders in their 
business structures and therefore can avoid the suitability and appropriateness obligations 
imposed by article 19 of the Financial Instruments Directive and article 52 of Directive 
2006/73/EC.65 
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The question then is how to define the role of platforms in P2PL. One could compare P2PL 
platforms, by analogy, to internet search engines. General search engines such as Google 
allow users to locate webpages even when they are unaware of specific internet addresses or 
to find a selection of webpages concerning chosen topics.66 Google enables users to do this 
by entering terms in a search field and clicking the search button, while it constantly updates 
an index of billions of webpages that allows it to respond to users’ search requests.67 At some 
point, Google search results would display two types of results: “organic search results” that 
are ranked in order of relevance to the user’s search terms; and “sponsored links” that are in 
the form of advertisements created by or at the direction of advertisers paying Google to 
display the links. However, Google has no control over users’ search terms or the material 
available on various websites it indexes. 
In Google Inc v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission,68 the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission sought to establish that Google had contravened 
section 52 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 which prohibits misleading and 
deceptive business conduct directly by producing or creating misleading sponsored links. 
Google sought to rely on section 85(3) which provides a defence for a person whose business 
it is to publish or arrange for publication of advertisements and who has received an 
advertisement for publication in the ordinary course of business not knowing and having no 
reason to suspect that its publication contravenes section 52. The Australian High Court held 
that Google does not author the sponsored links it displays or publishes.69 Each aspect of 
sponsored links is determined by advertisers and the automated response of Google’s search 
 
66
 Google Inc v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2013] HCA 1 at [19]. 
67
 Google [2013] HCA 1 at [20]. 
68
 Google [2013] HCA 1. 
69
 Google [2013] HCA 1 at [68]. 
21 
 
engine is determined by users’ search requests.  The nature of the internet and the technology 
behind the display of sponsored links following consumers’ search requests requires Google 
to “respond” to requests, but this merely amounts to the assembly of information provided by 
others for the purpose of displaying advertisements directed to Google’s users. Consequently, 
the court saw Google as just a means of communication between advertisers and 
consumers.70 The fact that Google staff had assisted advertisers in selecting keywords that 
would match websites to internet users’ search terms did not demonstrate that Google’s 
personnel, rather than advertisers, had chosen relevant keywords nor created, endorsed or 
adopted them.  
Google’s case therefore suggests that online intermediaries are not liable for third party 
information. A similar approach to P2PL will exclude platforms from liability to lenders for 
misleading, deceptive or inaccurate statements provided by borrowers. Lenders bear losses 
arising from such statements unless a basic duty to verify borrowers’ information is imposed 
on platforms. Just as internet search engines match users’ search terms to related websites, 
P2PL platforms match lenders’ search for borrowers of particular ratings grades, particular 
borrowing purposes or other search criteria to borrowers that correspond with the search 
criteria. Platforms also match borrowers to lenders willing to lend at desired interest rates. As 
a facilitator, a platform has no control over the risk choices of lenders and, consequently, the 
list of borrowers drawn up by a search. Following Google’s reasoning, platforms may not be 
liable for misleading and inaccurate borrowers’ listings by merely communicating 
information the borrowers provided. 
Platforms are arguably akin to meta-search engines because of the significant level of control 
they exercise in data translation, transfer and utilisation. Meta-search engines play a more 
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active role than Google and other general search engines by systematically reutilising the 
contents of other databases in translating end users’ search terms.71 However, a more 
analogous intermediation to P2PL platforms seems to be a developer of an integrated set of 
computer programs that enables users to undertake data processing and statistical analysis 
tasks. The independent nature of users’ tasks does not preclude the existence of the 
developer’s ownership of intellectual property over such programs.72 P2PL platforms 
similarly display some “ownership” of the processes that enable lenders and borrowers to 
independently take transactional decisions. Platforms provide an asymmetrical environment 
where lenders and borrowers do not actually meet to discuss and agree on transactional terms, 
such as method and time of repayments, which are largely determined by platforms. P2P 
lenders cannot, for instance, provide the borrowers with an accurate percentage rate of charge 
(APR) since each lender lends a small fraction of the loan. The rules on APR73 can apply to 
P2PL only if the actively coordinating role of the platforms is recognised. Platforms are also 
more likely than lenders to be able to impose credit limits on borrowers and fees for over 
limit, late payment, non-payment, underpayment, dishonoured payments and other penalties. 
It is instructive that in consumer credit terms such as repayment instalments are considered as 
essential contractual obligations.74  
A possible argument from this description of the P2PL processes is that if regulations do not 
deem platforms as parties to lender-borrower contracts or agents of either lenders or 
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borrowers, at the least platforms should be regarded as fiduciaries. The significance is that a 
fiduciary has good faith obligations and is required to disclose material facts to a lender even 
if the fiduciary is not the borrower.75 It is recognised in market abuse regulation, for example, 
that a fiduciary has the duty to make full disclosure to market participants.76 However, a 
party’s position as an intermediary does not necessarily impose a disclosure obligation. This 
is confirmed by some recent cases involving the non-disclosure of substantial commissions 
by lenders/intermediary for an associated insurance company.77 On the other hand, P2PL 
platforms often rely on credit ratings of borrowers provided either by third party credit ratings 
agencies, or by themselves, as a way to inspire the trust of lenders in the borrowers’ ability to 
pay back, albeit the final decision on the risk level of borrowers lies with the lender. 
Theoretically, there are two ways P2PL platforms can be liable for losses suffered by lenders 
for relying on incorrect or misleading credit ratings. Firstly, platforms can be liable for 
communicating misleading or incorrect information originally provided by borrowers either 
through information gathered to produce credit ratings or through additional information 
posted on P2PL discussion boards. Google’s case suggests that this is unlikely to be the legal 
position. Another possible barrier is the common law objection to damages award for pure 
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economic loss in the absence of a contractual relationship between the platforms and the 
lenders.78 
Secondly, platforms can be liable for poor advice to lenders through credit ratings they 
supply by establishing a fiduciary duty of care towards lenders. However, the common law 
suggests that it is possible but unlikely for platforms to hold a fiduciary duty towards P2P 
lenders. By analogy to the traditional lender-borrower dichotomy, a long-standing general 
principle is that unless a bank clearly undertakes to advise a customer, it is under no duty to 
provide advice on the suitability or risks of a particular transaction from that customer’s 
perspective.79 There is no duty if a “bank did not cross the line which separates, on the one 
hand, the activity of giving information about and selling a product and, on the other hand, 
the activity of giving advice.”80 For example, in Williams & Glyn’s Bank v Barnes81 an 
experienced businessman borrowed £1 million from a bank when his company was already 
heavily indebted to the same bank. When the company became insolvent and the bank called 
in the personal loan, the businessman argued that the bank breached its duty to him in 
providing the personal loan knowing that his company was experiencing difficulties. The 
court held that the bank had no duty to advise unless there was a clear assumption of 
responsibility.  
 
78
 See P. Giliker, “Revisiting pure economic loss: lessons to be learnt from the Supreme Court of Canada?” 
(2005) 25 Legal Studies 49. 
79
 See Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
80
 Green and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc (Financial Conduct Authority intervening) [2013] EWCA 
Civ 1197, [2014] Bus LR 168 at [23]. 
81
 Williams and Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Barnes [1981] Com LR 205. 
25 
 
Williams may be contrasted with Verity and Spindler v Lloyds Bank plc.82 The claimants in 
Verity specifically sought the advice of a bank manager on the prudence of a transaction. The 
bank manager, who assumed the role of financial advisor, had been negligent in the advice 
provided. It was particularly significant that in establishing the request for financial advice 
the claimants were financially unsophisticated and the bank’s brochure advertised free 
financial advice.  In the more recent case of Plevin v Paragon Finance,83 the critical factors 
for liability was a broker’s advertisement of its readiness to find “the finance plan that’s best 
for you” and its conduct of a demands, needs and suitability assessment for the borrower. 
Verity and Plevin are unlikely to apply to P2PL where platforms refrain from advertising and 
giving free or paid advice. Moreover, to regard credit ratings devised by external agencies as 
potentially misleading advice by platforms is unlikely to happen since platforms merely 
supply the credit ratings and communicate information borrowers provided to lenders. 
Nevertheless, platforms’ role in P2PL is not entirely passive. Platforms, for instance, provide 
supportive administrative processes for P2PL and grades and analyses potential borrowers.84 
Lenders are dependent on platforms and third party businesses to recuperate losses from 
defaulting borrowers.85 In the worst case scenario where a platform collapses, lenders cannot 
independently pursue debt collection.86 Independent identification of borrowers and their 
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location is difficult because of the anonymity of online P2PL users.87 Although anonymity 
may be beneficial by preventing undue distribution of personal information and the use of 
intimidation to recuperate debt, it results in complete reliance on platforms which are in fact 
unreliable debt recovery agents.88 For example, many lenders were left with minimal chance 
of recovering their money when Quakle, a UK P2PL platform, collapsed in 2011.89  
In the UK, unlike bank customers, lenders on P2PL platforms are not covered by the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS), a compensation fund of last resort for 
customers of financial services firms authorised by the FCA and the Prudential Regulation 
Authority.90 The FSCS protects deposits, insurance policies and home finance and pays 
compensation to customers where firms have stopped trading or are in default.91 Bank 
depositors usually qualify for a guarantee of savings to a maximum of £85,000. However, 
lenders in loan-based P2PL have no recourse to the FSCS for the monies lent to borrowers 
should platforms fail or borrowers default on repayments although un-lent funds that 
platforms hold in bank accounts would be within the remit of the FSCS.92 Platforms may 
voluntarily choose but are not legally required to provide a similar safety net for lenders. 
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Ratesetter’s provision fund is an example.93 Similarly, Zopa’s “safeguard fund” introduced in 
April 2013 and held in trust by P2PS Limited would intervene to repay loans plus interest in 
the event that a borrower default on four loan repayments. Not all platforms have this type of 
fund and even if they do, there is no guarantee that such funds would not prematurely run out.  
The above account demonstrates that the online P2PL system has not completely ridden its 
lending market of intermediaries. The fact is that platforms intermediate between lenders and 
borrowers that use their service, including the provision of auction mechanisms. Although 
platforms are not considered to be the direct lenders to borrowers, detailed examination of 
cash flow movements on such sites indicates that cash does not move directly from the lender 
to the borrower, and neither do repayments move directly from borrowers to lenders.94 
Rather, platforms tend to take on an intermediary role of exchange facilitation while taking 
commissions.95 P2PL platforms are therefore not merely a communication post office-like or 
facilitative general search engine-like entity. Notwithstanding platforms’ obvious attempts to 
avoid being labelled a party to contracts between lenders and borrowers, the reality is that 
neither the lender nor the borrower knows much about the other party and the complexities of 
the lending transaction. Platforms, in contrast, are likely to have the necessary information 
and expertise.  
Strictly speaking, platforms are not parties to the borrower-lender contract and consequently 
there is no “business” counterparty in the traditional consumer protection approach since both 
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lenders and borrowers are the sole contractual parties and are not ordinarily acting in the 
normal course of business. Being that platforms play some active roles, the classical bilateral 
business-versus-consumer protection approach does not sit comfortably with the tripartite 
model largely practised in online P2PL.  For instance the statutory obligation to provide 
statements of loans to borrowers under s.77A of the Consumer Credit Act 197496 assumes 
that the existence of a powerful duty-bearing lender acting in the normal course of business 
and playing an active role in the transaction. The idea of protecting one party against the 
other stronger party reflects the business-to-consumer understanding underpinning the UK 
and EU consumer policies. For example, in Director General of Fair Trading v First 
National Bank plc, Lord Steyn observed that consumer law “treats consumers as 
presumptively weaker parties and therefore fit for protection from abuses by the stronger 
contracting parties.”97 In Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Rocio Murciano Quinero then, the 
ECJ stated that the EU consumer protection approach is based on the idea that the consumer 
is in a weaker position compared to the seller, particularly regarding bargaining power and 
knowledge.98  Rather than be seen through the lens of the orthodox bilateral business-to-
consumer relationship, online P2PL suggests the existence of an integrated organisation of 
three main parts- platform, lender and borrower.99 As the systems theory demonstrates, a 
holistic view recognising the interplay of the parts of the P2PL entity is required because 
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problems in a part have consequences for the other parts.100 This article will therefore 
proceed to discuss the implications of the orthodox consumer protection approach to P2PL. 
Beyond pre-contract protection 
Consumer protection regulation is traditionally regarded as a body of laws designed to 
prevent individuals from taking on excessive risks101 and to protect consumers’ interests at 
the individual transaction levels.102 Relevant “harm” is considered a failure in individual 
transactions and usually occurs at the origination stage or in the substance of a transaction.103 
This explains why most consumer protection measures such as information disclosure focus 
on the pre-contractual stage of transactions and aim to prevent failures that inhibit 
consumers’ ability to enhance their welfare.104 For example, bargaining power and 
knowledge is often highlighted in the EU consumer policy and suggests an approach that 
leans heavily towards the pre-contractual stage of transactions. Although EU consumer law 
has introduced post-contractual withdrawal and cancellation rights in favour of consumers, it 
is only applicable in limited cases such as distance and doorstep selling to enable consumers 
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to reverse irrational decisions.105 As confirmed in the new Consumer Rights Directive,106 
withdrawal/cancellation rights in such contracts protect consumers who are vulnerable 
because of the lack of opportunity to inspect goods and to meet, discuss and agree on 
contractual terms.107 
Limiting consumer protection to pre-contractual scenarios only seems too restrictive and 
inadequate for P2PL because of its peculiar nature. Although P2P lenders, for example, face 
information asymmetries before agreeing to lend, the main concern is the execution and 
performance of loan contracts, including prompt loan repayments and debt collection. Unlike 
banks, P2P lenders are largely incapable of establishing and operating their own debt 
recovery arrangements. The provision of appropriate amount of pre-contractual information 
may be necessary but it is an insufficient protection for such lenders. This suggests the need 
for a more interventionist approach to the post-contractual side of P2PL transactions rather 
than the traditional focus on pre-contract protection. 
The new FCA regulations therefore seem right in attempting to protect lenders from adverse 
situations following the formation of P2P loan contracts. For example, a loan-based P2PL 
platform is required to take reasonable steps to have arrangements in place to ensure the 
continued management and administration of P2P loan agreements in the event that it fails or 
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ceases to carry on the business.108 This provision protects lenders from the uncertainty and 
costs of recuperating loan payments from unidentifiable and anonymous borrowers, but it has 
a limited scope. There is no prescribed form of arrangements and platforms are free to design 
and introduce processes that suit their business model.109 Although this lack of uniform 
standards is understandably in the interests of balancing regulatory costs and benefits,110 it 
still leaves the meaning of an appropriate arrangement open to debate between platforms and 
regulators. Whilst this allows a more tailored procedure, it could lead to more work for 
regulators in the long term. Should an arranged third party loan administrator fail, the 
appropriateness of the procedure would arise and be dealt with by regulators on a firm-by-
firm basis.  The FCA has not specified the consequences of the failure of arrangements, 
culpability for failures and, most importantly, lenders’ alternative recourse. Platforms are 
only required to warn lenders of the risks involved and that safeguarding measures may not 
work as expected.111 Potential lenders are expected to take these factors into consideration or 
at least be aware of them when deciding to lend on particular platforms and will ultimately 
bear the risk of failure. This approach therefore follows the rational choice model of 
consumer protection that emphasises limited pre-contractual disclosure and leaves little room 
for the outcomes of consumer decisions such as repayment default and inability to recuperate 
debt as well as post-contractual remedies such as reimbursement of money paid and provision 
of new services.  
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Rational choice, behaviouralism and information 
 
Rational choice theory and behaviouralism are the main philosophical approaches to 
consumer protection and regulating consumer welfare. While efficiency is the main goal of 
rational choice theory, behaviouralism focuses on fairness. Rational choice is the idea that 
people are rational economic beings who, when faced with a number of choices, will choose 
the one that maximises their welfare.112 Prices in the market reflect the choices of market 
participants and thus guarantee market efficiency.113 Rational choice theory supports the 
libertarian view that participants in lending transactions should be free to make decisions and 
assume risks arising from such decisions.114 Consequently, rational choice theorists favour a 
non-interventionist approach to consumer protection, use of limited regulatory tools such as 
information disclosure115 and promotion of competition between businesses to provide 
 
112
 F. Akinbami, “Financial services and consumer protection after the crisis” (2011) 29(2) International 
Journal of Bank Marketing 134; J. Hanson and D. Yosifon, “The situational character: A critical realist 
perspective on the human animal” (2004) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 1 at 8-15, 138-152. 
113
 G. Sindler, “Behavioural finance and investor protection regulations” (2011) 34 Journal of Consumer Policy 
315 at 317. 
114
 D. Baker and M. Breitenstein, “History repeats itself: Why interest rate caps pave the way for the return of 
the loan sharks” (2010) 127 Banking Law Journal 581; A. Labat and W. Block, “Money does not grow on trees: 
an argument for usury” (2012) 106 Journal of Business Ethics 383. 
115
 Howells, “The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information” (2005) 32 Journal of Law 
and Society 349; T. Wilson, N. Howell and G. Sheehan, “Protecting the most vulnerable in consumer credit 
transactions” (2009) 32 Journal of Consumer Policy 117 at 120-125. 
33 
 
consumers with an optimum number of choices.116 As the EU Consumer Protection Strategy 
2007-2013 confirms, the aim is the responsibilisation of consumers towards promoting and 
protecting their interests.117  
The implication is that information is essential for consumers to make efficient and rational 
choices on consumption and resource allocation.118 Rational choice is based on the 
assumptions that consumers will have enough information to base their preferences on and 
make clear and rational choices.119 It also assumes that consumers will, when making 
decisions, collect and evaluate the information available and base their decisions on this 
information alone.120 In the context of online P2PL, this would imply that regulation should 
only ensure that platforms provide lenders and borrowers with as much accurate information 
as is necessary for them to enter into the right transactions. This non-interventionist approach 
is in fact imbibed by P2PL business models such as Zopa. In such cases, platforms as non-
parties to lending contracts merely match consumers to one another and facilitate 
communication of both private information (credit scoring) and public information (from the 
P2PL discussion boards). Platforms provide lenders with credit reports and in some cases 
teach them how to use such reports but effectively leaves it to lenders to make a choice based 
on the reports and a number of investing heuristics. 
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However, this rational choice approach can be problematic for several reasons. Firstly, 
information asymmetry often exists in consumer transactions because consumers are 
significantly less able than traders to collect and process information.121 Consequently, 
regulators generally seem to select disclosure as the default consumer protection method.122 
The idea is that market inefficiency arising from significant differences in information 
endowments between market participants can be resolved through accurate disclosures that 
can ensure an information balance and enable informed choices by market participants.123 
However, this rationale has doubtful application to P2PL. Platforms can and often do provide 
general information about how to lend and choose borrowers to lend to, but they do not 
provide further information to lenders about individual transactions which they are not party 
to. Platforms essentially present information borrowers provided for lenders and often refrain 
from doing more. Even if platforms owe a duty to ensure that borrowers’ credit ratings are 
accurate and presented to lenders in a way they can understand and use it, it does little to 
balance the risk to lenders. Whilst disclosure might lead to improvements in the quality and 
extent of consumer information, it has little bearing on consumers’ ability to comprehend the 
information provided.124 
Regulators often attempt to correct the information asymmetry by requiring increasing 
amounts of information. However, this may not always suit P2PL as the participants may not 
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have much investment or lending knowledge and expertise.125 It is also more likely the case 
that the lender’s main risk of loss of money through borrowers’ default126 cannot be solved 
through more and more information or more and more appropriately presented information. 
Large amounts of information then become an internal transaction cost and consumers who 
engage in P2PL for personal reasons rather than business gain may disregard it as being too 
complex or too much.127 Although rational choice theory assumes that individuals are willing 
to read the information provided, behavioural theory shows that too much information may 
not be a good thing. The mis-selling of payment protection insurance (PPI), a current 
controversial issue in the UK, demonstrates this type of consumer behaviour. In cases where 
PPI was sold to consumers on a non-advised basis- the financial firm only has a duty to 
provide information consumers need to make an informed choice and to present it in a clear, 
fair and not misleading manner128 - it is likely that many consumers either did not read the 
terms and conditions of the agreement, understand the product literature, or seek further 
advice. 
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Secondly, behavioural research demonstrates that consumer decisions are often irrational and 
influenced by emotion129 and risk-underestimating and information-averse optimism.130 
People do not always make rational choices or act in ways that maximise their personal 
welfare. Rather, the simplification of complicated information through the use of heuristics 
combined with the natural tendency of people to copy each other’s choices131 can lead to poor 
decisions. Herding, for example, is a typical distorted irrational behaviour often displayed by 
individuals.132  
Thirdly, the main source of risk information for P2P lenders is credit ratings provided by 
platforms or subcontracted credit ratings agencies. As third party sources of information, 
P2PL platforms and credit rating agencies may not always be what they appear to be. It is not 
unfeasible, for example, to conceive of shell companies set up as P2PL platforms being used 
as vehicles to commit fraud. The collapse of Enron and the recent global financial crisis 
indicated that in some cases information provided by ratings agencies lack credibility due to a 
conflict of interests between issuers paying for ratings services and the agencies’ need to 
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remain objective.133 Arguably, this type of conflict of interests may not apply to online P2PL 
since borrowers may not be in a position to develop tainted relationships with credit ratings 
agencies in a way that affects transactions. However, it still provides an example of the fact 
that P2PL participants often base their decisions on risk assessments of information providers 
they may not have the tools or capabilities to verify or monitor. Even when lenders have 
access to borrowers’ credit scores, they may not have access to comparison scores to be able 
to adjust minimum scores for loans and other requirements that reflect the state of the market. 
The lender and borrower are not in a contractual relationship with credit rating agencies and, 
therefore, cannot bring contractual claims against false and misleading information. A 
tortious claim for negligence is also unlikely because the requirement of assumption of 
responsibility134 can be avoided by an appropriate disclaimer from credit rating agencies to 
platforms, which is commonplace in the credit rating industry.135 Platforms, on the other 
hand, can prove a contractual relationship with credit rating agencies and bring contractual 
claims against inaccurate statements.  A regulatory duty on platforms to provide fair and 
accurate information to lenders and borrowers may make it easier for platforms to prove 
damages against credit rating agencies. 
Fourthly, there may be information asymmetries between contracting parties in any one 
transaction that create opportunities for fraud.136 This is particularly important for the online 
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P2PL financial market because of its aim of encouraging and facilitating transactions between 
strangers.137 A party may attempt to deceive the other through false information such as when 
borrowers commit credit score fraud or falsify documents to obtain loans. It is possible to 
legally require borrowers to provide more detailed information about their financial situation, 
including whether they are or have been involved in bankruptcies and financial difficulties, 
the amount of existing debts, borrowing history and other details. However, P2P borrowers 
may not be worthy civil claim defendants for lenders in comparison to platforms with greater 
financial means.   
Being that the risk is not between a platform and a consumer, but between two different 
consumers who under some models may not know each other, a regulatory strategy that 
overcomes the strict legal structure of P2PL transactions may be necessary. With reference to 
the previous discussion about power in consumer relationships, this suggests that, in the 
interests of lender protection for example, regulations may consider in greater detail whether 
it is worth holding P2PL platforms liable as a connected party for the conduct of participants. 
The information paradigm can work in this context only if the law recognises the connected 
liability of platforms either as deemed principals or agents, after all platforms provide the 
critical link between lenders and borrowers. This recognition of a tripartite relationship is 
analogous to the connected creditor liability in consumer credit regulations, such as sections 
56 and 75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.138 
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FCA regulations: beyond non-interventionism in P2PL 
This article has so far highlighted certain consumer protection issues that any regulatory 
regime needs to recognise to be able to limit the risks associated with online P2PL and 
provide adequate protection for both its lending and borrowing consumers. The potential and 
limitations of consumer protection regulation of P2PL will now be considered in the light of 
the recent regulatory intervention by the FCA. In view of the FCA’s aim of ensuring 
proportionate regulation and the relatively embryonic condition of the P2PL market, it is 
highly unlikely that regulators will impose additional burdens on platforms in the near future. 
However, there is a degree of interventionism in the FCA’s regulatory approach which rightly 
incorporates a number of consumer protection measures. The pre-contractual side of 
transactions are largely disclosure-based, whilst post-contractual measures include prudential 
requirements, client money rules and recourse to the Financial Ombudsman Service.  
This is therefore a departure from the UK’s non-interventionist “light-touch” regulation 
model linked by some to the uncontrolled systemic risks associated with consumer defaults in 
the recent financial crisis.139 One could possibly argue that as the amounts lent by one P2P 
lender to a particular borrower constitutes a small fraction of the total loan facilitated by a 
platform and sourced from numerous lenders, the lender’s risk and loss in the event of the 
borrower’s default is too insignificant to warrant a more interventionist post-contract 
protection. However, P2P lenders and borrowers are part of wider society and can affect and 
be affected by it. It is not hard to assume that should the P2PL market continue to grow and 
matures into a major source of finance for individuals and businesses, the inability of a large 
number of borrowers to repay P2P loans can lead to a systemic financial crisis. 
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One of the operational objectives of the FCA is, therefore, to strike a balance between the 
principles of consumer protection and consumer responsibility by adopting a differentiated 
approach that considers “appropriate” consumer protection in each situation.140 The aim is to 
ensure that different consumers are dealt with in different ways, for example, by recognising 
that purchasers of pension policies and buyers of car insurance policies have different 
needs.141 Regulators are consequently expected to consider in each scenario what level of 
knowledge it is reasonable to expect from consumers, how complex are relevant financial 
products, the degrees of risk involved in different types of investment and transactions and 
differing levels of experience and expertise of different consumers.142 The Parliamentary 
Joint Committee argued that these factors are insufficient and need to be complemented by a 
corresponding responsibility on firms to act honestly, fairly and professionally in their 
customers’ best interests and, for example, by addressing consumers’ need for advice and 
information that is timely, accurate, intelligible and appropriately presented.143 This 
argument, however, has a rational choice basis: information alone is not enough to improve 
consumers’ ability to make informed decisions if it is not easily understandable and 
accessible.144 
Consequently, the consumer protection regime of the FCA is chiefly based on disclosure as a 
means of ensuring that lenders have the fair and clear information they need to make 
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informed investment decisions.145 A similar approach is followed in existing consumer credit 
rules as a “counterbalance” to the unequal bargaining relationship between commercial 
lenders and consumers.146 The FCA has further adopted a principles-based regulatory 
approach that refrains from prescribing specific disclosures and their form and content. 
Rather, platforms are required to disclose appropriate and accurate information to their 
customers after identifying investment risks inherent in or relevant to their business models 
and the information their customers need to make informed decisions.147 The underlying 
assumption is that P2PL business models vary148 and each platform is in a better position than 
regulators to know the risks in their operations and their customers’ needs.  
 
Another reason for essentially leaving platforms free to self-regulate disclosures to P2PL 
participants is in the interest of balancing regulatory costs and benefits.149 This ensures that 
platforms are engaged in the regulatory process and allows consumer protection appropriately 
tailored to the operations of particular platforms. However, this method of business-oriented 
enforced self-regulation can lead to a lack of uniform information and disclosure standards 
amongst platforms. This can affect lenders’ ability to compare the risks of various platforms 
when choosing which platform to invest on and compound the information asymmetry faced 
by lenders and lead to confusion. A self-regulation approach does not take cognizance of the 
dominance of caveat emptor in the operation of online P2PL platforms and the great deal of 
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responsibility it places on inexperienced lenders. This arguably amounts to abandoning 
consumers to the risks of the market they operate in.150 In the long run, this may not be good 
for the market if lenders build up too much negative experience from using P2PL platforms 
and lose confidence in the market and eventually abandon this investment method. Moreover, 
the prevalence of participants’ anonymity and pseudonymity in the P2PL industry makes it 
difficult for effective consumer interactivity and information sharing. In other contexts, 
online consumer opinions and reviews constitute influential sources of information for 
consumers and the consumer-oriented self-regulation that may be necessary for the 
effectiveness of business-oriented enforced self-regulation.151 
 
On the other hand, a purely interventionist approach is not totally satisfactory due to its 
regulatory burdens and costs. Moreover, the consumer-to-consumer nature of P2PL suggests 
the impracticality of a completely prescriptive regulation of platforms that normally act as 
bystanders to transactions. The structure of Zopa and other P2PL platforms indicate that a 
limited interventionist consumer protection approach fits most P2PL business models. 
Disclosure-based regulation is appropriate at the start of transactions when lenders make 
decisions on the basis of information collated by platforms from borrowers. A limited 
interventionist approach to disclosure requiring an element of financial education to improve 
consumer comprehension of relevant information may be useful. It is not out of place to 
require platforms to play a part in educating their customers about financial risks and 
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implications for their investments since disclosure actually imposes on consumers the 
responsibility of making sound choices based on the information provided. 
Limiting the number of loans medium to high risk borrowers can take out at any one time on 
any P2PL platform is another possible regulatory measure. This limited interventionist 
measure would require communication between platforms and possibly the formulation of a 
borrower database of P2PL loans. The database could be managed through the P2P 
Association and governed by data protection laws. It may be accessible only to platform 
moderators and credit risk agencies, except where borrowers request copies of their personal 
information under the data protection law. 
In any case, disclosure, financial education and other pre-contract measures may not be 
sufficient to protect lenders from potential problems that can occur during the lifespan of P2P 
loans. There are elements that cannot easily be predicted at the pre-contract stage such as the 
risk of a borrower’s default, inflation risk and the possibility of the platform itself failing.152 
This suggests that a more interventionist approach than pre-contractual requirement may be 
necessary to protect lenders and provide them with remedies for post-transaction events. For 
example, platforms’ membership of a compensation scheme can tackle the problems of 
borrowers’ bankruptcy and potential insolvency of platforms and resulting losses to P2P 
lenders. Compensation schemes provide lenders with the assurance that at least some of their 
money would be recoverable if all were to go wrong. It may be particularly useful for 
unsophisticated and financially illiterate lenders who lack the time, skill, information and 
resources required to monitor the financial health of borrowers and platforms ahead of default 
or insolvency. A compensation scheme goes some way in inspiring greater confidence in the 
P2PL market and possibly encouraging more investments and participation in the market.  
 
152
  Lumpkin, "Consumer protection and financial innovation" (2010) OECD J Finance Mark Trends 117 at 124. 
44 
 
However, there is the need to avoid a moral hazard from a regulated compensation scheme if 
P2P lenders rely heavily on regulators to prevent the fallout of insolvency or to bail them out 
if insolvency were to happen. Lenders can become careless, less prudent and free-riders of 
the state by passing the risk to regulators and tax-payers. Although this might not be an issue 
if borrowers’ defaults are few and far between, there may be significant bailout costs where 
incidences are high or are coupled with either a platform’s insolvency or inability and 
incompetence in debt collection. One way of addressing the moral hazard issue involves an 
element of consumer responsibility in the form of lender prudence by restricting lenders’ 
recourse to a compensatory system. A compensation scheme could be limited to lenders that 
undertook reasonable steps to evaluate platforms and borrowers before committing funds for 
P2P loans. A possible candidate for protection is when lenders choose to lend to quasi-
riskless borrowers like those rated grades A-B or previously classified as having a highly 
unlikely chance of default. In contrast, subprime loans and loans to grades C-D borrowers 
may be excluded from a compensation scheme as such loans imply the acceptance of 
responsibility for risky investments in the expectation of high returns. 
In recognition of the tripartite nature of P2PL relationships, it may be useful to modify the 
existing scheme of the Financial Ombudsman Scheme (FOS).153 The FOS determines 
disputes between consumer debtors and commercial lenders who hold Consumer Credit Act 
licences.154 As it stands there is no room in the FOS scheme for P2P lender-platform disputes 
despite the fact that such lenders are essentially consumers in no position to bargain with 
platforms. Moreover, the lenders and borrowers have no remutalistic opportunity for direct 
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contact and dispute resolution since the inter-related P2PL contracts are initiated by and 
intricately linked to the platforms. 
Entry authorisation and capital requirements are other methods of ensuring the efficiency of 
platforms and therefore inspiring confidence in the online P2PL market. A licensing system 
and capital requirements for platforms could help prevent future problems in the market and 
ensure that platforms are subject to similar standards, conduct of business rules and financial 
supervision.155 This could potentially prevent poor business operations and inefficiencies and 
situations like Quakle’s collapse from eroding confidence in the market. In this regard, 
compulsory schemes may be more effective than their voluntary counterparts. For example, 
the Operating Principles of the P2P Association require members to maintain funds 
calculated in accordance with Method A of the Payment Services Regulations 2009.156 The 
benefit of the capital requirement in ensuring platform’s liquidity is limited because the P2P 
Association is voluntary and at present has only three member platforms. It seems quite right 
that the FCA prudential regulations direct that all platforms must ensure that at all times their 
financial resources are not less than their financial requirements.157 
Conclusion 
The internet has facilitated the relatively recent emergence of a growing P2PL industry as an 
online alternative to traditional bank and non-bank lending. P2PL presents both unrivalled 
opportunities for easy consumer-to-consumer lending and peculiar consumer protection 
challenges that confront its nascent regulation. An effective regulatory strategy has to 
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understand the overt and sometimes disguised factual and counterfactual contexts of the 
P2PL business model which demonstrate an active and controlling platforms’ role. This 
article therefore situates the P2PL market in key consumer protection debates concerning the 
definition of a consumer, the degree and appropriateness of regulatory interventions, 
efficiency and fairness as consumer protection rationales, and disclosure and substantive 
intervention as regulatory strategies. By altering the characteristics of participants in a 
lending transaction, P2PL necessitates a reconsideration of what it means to be a consumer of 
financial services. Additionally, the bilateral business-versus-customer terminology of 
traditional consumer protection does not fit the P2PL consumer-to-consumer model that is in 
fact a tripartite relationship involving the intermediation of platforms that play more than 
passive, facilitative roles. These unique features of P2PL create the regulatory problem of the 
appropriate degree of consumer protection, particularly for lenders who are almost on all 
fours with borrowers as consumers.  
The FCA has relied heavily on information regulation in its new P2PL regime and ruled out 
more interventionist approaches for the time being in the interest of proportionality. 
However, the inadequacies of the FCA regulatory regime include the classification of P2P 
lenders as retail investors, a term that disguises the lenders’ true status as consumers of 
financial services. It is not even clear whether P2PL platforms are liable as intermediaries for 
any inaccurate or false financial information provided by borrowers. A more interventionist 
approach than business-oriented self-regulation and pre-contract information appears suitable 
for the P2PL industry. Protecting lenders from post-contractual risks such as borrower default 
and platform failure requires more than just clear and appropriate information. Possible 
substantive interventions include incorporating P2PL in the FOS scheme, licensing of 
platforms and compensation schemes for P2P lenders.  
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